of
popular contemporary imagination. Francisco Pizarro and the Spanish conquistadors became fabulously wealthy by looting the Inkan
Empire, but to actually govern common Andeans their successors fell
back on the systems of imperial control pioneered by the Romans
and Umayyads. Consequently, although the Spanish Crown’s empire
in South America lasted into the nineteenth century, it struggled to
exert direct control over the hybrid local communities of Spanish settlers, Andeans, and African slaves that emerged from the wreckage of
the Inkan Empire.
Introduction 7
The apparent longevity and coherence of Britain’s empire in India
is equally misleading. It was the British East India Company, not the
Crown, that won the right to collect taxes in Bengal in the name of
the Mughal emperors. Posing as Mughal vassals, grasping company
employees known as nabobs wrung enormous profi ts out of Bengal
and the rest of India by taking over its revenue collection systems.
Ordinary Bengalis probably paid little attention because one set of
tribute collectors simply appeared to replace another, but in time
they realized that their new overseers had an insatiable appetite for
revenue. Imperial enthusiasts credit the British East India Company
with integrating India into the global capitalist order, but the cost for
common people was economic dislocation, cultural degradation, and
in some cases famine.
Conversely, the development of the nation-state in the late eighteenth century rendered empire unsustainable in the west. Premodern empires were relatively stable because local customs and identities
were strong enough to mitigate the crushing effects of foreign rule.
Nationalism, which imagined that populations were culturally and
ethnically homogeneous, made it more diffi cult to recruit these allies.
It also rendered imperial rule far more onerous by alienating those
who clung to local identities.9 Napoleon Bonaparte’s empire was supposedly based on the universalizing ideals of the French Revolution—
liberty, equality, fraternity—but for local communities Napoleonic
rule meant unyielding demands for tribute and military conscripts.
This was a new and more burdensome kind of nationalistic and
extractive empire building, one that employed modern bureaucratic
and policing tools to intervene more extensively into the daily lives of
conquered people than ever before. Yet the beginnings of nationalism
also inspired many people in Italy and throughout Europe to defend
their autonomy, which contributed to the rapid demise of Napoleon’s
short-lived empire.
Although formal imperial rule was no longer feasible in Europe,
in the late nineteenth century westerners engaged in a fi nal spasm
of empire building, known as the “new imperialism,” in Africa and
Asia. With the exception of Russia, the nations that took part in this
“scramble” were, to varying degrees, liberal democracies. Pandering to
the humanitarian concerns of western voting publics, empire builders
promised both to extract profi ts and to civilize. While the invention of
8 THE RULE OF EMPIRES
advanced weapons such as the Maxim gun was hardly a great cultural
achievement, the new imperial conquerors equated military weakness with racial inferiority. The result was a brutal and humiliating
system of imperial domination. In practice, however, these empires
were viable only as long as subject populations identifi ed themselves
in local terms. Once the common experience of imperial subjugation
inspired Africans and Asians to think collectively (if not nationally),
imperial rule collapsed.
The Third Reich was also a twentieth-century empire. Counting
Nazi-occupied France as an imperial case study may seem controversial
because it equates suffering under German rule with the experiences
of Africans and Asians. Yet in many ways Hitler was the most honest
empire builder of the modern era. Where the British and French used
racist