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document now. We will have to take it home, and we will examine it there. It is not something that should be part of the visit.” When Hadley called to get the Israeli reaction, Weissglas replied, “Look, it's a six-page document. For you it's six pages. For us it's our life. It's our future. So we need to examine it, and cannot give you any response to it now.” 4
    The sour Israeli reaction reflected, no doubt, their memory of the July Danish draft, which they had liked and had thought particularly strong in its handling of security issues. But it also reflected their anger at the way the text had been developed: without them. They were being presented by the United States with a fait accompli. They were asking themselves, “How is it that in our intimate dialogue with them they are presenting us with a document without even consulting us about it?” 5 Perhaps the answer lay in the choreography of the process: The idea had come from the EU and the Jordanians, and the president had then asked Burns to confer with Muasher, not with the Israelis. Still, as things had unfolded, the Israeli reaction was entirely predictable. It seemed that State was determined to develop a text without any Israeli input but with sufficient Arab and European support to make amendments impossible, and then to shove it down the Israelis’ throats. These tactics worked, at least in that the final text was almost identical with the October draft. But they weakened Israel's desire to adhere to the Roadmap's conditions, which were always seen as imposed more than agreed to, and they certainly strengthened the Israeli view that Powell and Burns could not be trusted.
    What did the Roadmap say? Its formal title – “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” – revealed immediately that, unlike the Arab Plan, it would address only Israeli-Palestinian and not Syrian or Lebanese issues (though these were given a nod at the end) and that it had a very clear objective: establishing a Palestinian state.
    The document began by stating its ambitious goals:
The following is a performance-based and goal-driven Roadmap, with clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet. The destination is a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005, as presented in President Bush's speech of 24 June.

    There followed some language that was close to the Bush message of the June 24 speech, but also laid the foundation for endless debate in future years:
A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty, and through Israel's readiness to do what is necessary for a democratic Palestinian state to be established, and a clear, unambiguous acceptance by both parties of the goal of a negotiated settlement as described below. The Quartet will assist and facilitate implementation of the plan, starting in Phase I, including direct discussions between the parties as required. The plan establishes a realistic timeline for implementation. However, as a performance-based plan, progress will require and depend upon the good faith efforts of the parties, and their compliance with each of the obligations outlined below. Should the parties perform their obligations rapidly, progress within and through the phases may come sooner than indicated in theplan. Non-compliance with obligations will impede progress. A settlement, negotiated between the parties, will result in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security