One Tribe at a Time: The Paper that Changed the War in Afghanistan Read Free Page B

has never been defeated. Time is on their side. Trust me. I have sat face to face with Afghans, both friends and enemies, who endure unimaginable hardships. They will do it, their children will do it and their children’s children will do it. They own all the time.
    When one says “Afghan people” what I believe they are really saying is “tribal member.” Every single Afghan is a part of a tribe and understands how the tribe operates and why. This is key for us to understand. Understanding and operating within the tribe is the only way we can ever know who our friends and enemies are, how the Afghan people think and what is important to them. Because, above all, they are tribesmen first.
    It is a matter of national security that the US government and specifically the military grasp the importance of the tribes and learn to operate comfortably in a tribal setting. This paper is about why and how we need to engage the tribal structure present in Afghanistan.
    A strategy in which the central government is the centerpiece of our counterinsurgency plan is destined to fail. It disenfranchises the very fabric of Afghan society.

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DEFINING “WIN”
    We have killed thousands and thousands of the “enemy” in Afghanistan and it clearly has not brought us closer to our objectives there. We could kill thousands more and still not be any closer five years from now.
    Everyone talks about “winning” in Afghanistan. But what does that mean? The most current definition from President Obama is to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” the terrorist network, al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. More importantly, the president also added, “and to prevent the return of al-Qaeda in either country in the future.”
    Although a topic for another paper, US forces in Afghanistan have accomplished that mission and could continue to do so until our national or political will to stay there runs out—and everyone knows this time is quickly approaching.
    We cannot make progress in Afghanistan through a war of attrition or a war of exhaustion. As I have said and will continue to say, time is on their side. In an insurgency, all the insurgents have to do is not lose. All they have to do is wear down the will of the counterinsurgent and in this case, the will of the American people and the American politicians.
    Either approach (attrition or exhaustion) will not work. We have killed thousands and thousands of the “enemy” in Afghanistan and it clearly has not brought us closer to our objectives there. Just as important is the fact that we could kill thousands more and still not be any closer five years from now.
    My definition of “success” (that is, “win”) includes the one currently in use. I would add: “…to facilitate security and prosperity for the Afghan people.” In other words, the tribes.
    We will be totally unable to protect the “civilians” in the rural areas of Afghanistan until we partner with the tribes for the long haul. Their tribal systems have been there for centuries and will be there for many more. Why should we fight against not only what they have been accustomed to for centuries, but what works for them? They will not change their tribal ways. And why should they?
Bottom Line
    “Winning” in Afghanistan will be an elusive prospect until we base our operations within the cultural framework of the tribal systems already in place.

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WE ARE LOSING THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN
    The former military commander in charge of Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, said in March 2009, “The coalition is not winning the war against the resurgent Taliban in certain parts of the country.” (Cowell 2009)
    Afghanistan has never had a strong central government and never will. That is a fact that we need to accept, sooner rather than later.
    Time and US popular support is the strategic center of gravity (COG) for US forces.
    Time and the population of not only Afghanistan but Pakistan is the strategic COG for the