One Tribe at a Time: The Paper that Changed the War in Afghanistan Read Free Page A

by working directly with their centuries-old tribal system. We can only do this by giving top priority to the most important political, social and military force in Afghanistan—the tribes. We must engage these tribes at a close and personal level with a much deeper cultural understanding than we have ever had before.
    When we gain the respect and trust of one tribe, in one area, a domino effect will spread throughout the region and beyond. One tribe will eventually become twenty-five or even fifty tribes. This can only have a long-term positive effect on the current situation. It is, however, not without pitfalls and difficulty.
    But it can and must be done.

    This is my vehicle after it hit an IED on the night of 24 Nov 2006 during my last tour in Iraq. The explosion flipped it three times and it was on fire when it landed. I was pinned inside and could not get out. I remember thinking, “So this is how it ends…” then I lost consciousness. My Iraqis somehow pulled me out and took care of me. Although I want to go back to Afghanistan so badly, I owe the Iraqis my life—and if they still need me, I feel obligated to go.
    Afghan tribes always have and always will resist any type of foreign intervention in their affairs.

INTRODUCTION
    The US has been in Afghanistan for eight years. We have fought hard and accomplished some good. Tactically, we have not lost a battle. Despite the lethal sophistication of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat, we defeat the Taliban in every engagement. But are we closer to our goals than we were eight years ago? Are the Afghan people closer to a stable way of life? Are we closer to our national strategic objectives there?
    Based on my time in Afghanistan—and my study of the region, tribes, counterinsurgency (COIN) and unconventional warfare (UW)—positive momentum in Afghanistan depends on the US forces’ support for the tribal systems already in place. Take it a step further and “advise, assist, train and lead” tribal security forces (Arbakais) much likewe have been doing with the Afghanistan National Army (ANA) and Afghanistan National Police (ANP).
    I will get into the specifics later in this paper, but what I believe must happen is a tribal movement supported by the US which allows the tribal leaders and the tribes they represent to have access to the local, district, provincial, and national leadership. This process has to be a “bottom-up” approach.
    There is no shortage of information detailing Afghan corruption at all levels of government. This directly affects the tribes. If the national government cannot protect “us,” if US forces cannot protect “us,” if we cannot protect ourselves…the only answer is to side with the Taliban. How can you blame anyone for that? I would do the same. As we all know, the answers to the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan have no purely military answer. However, the political strategy of governing from Kabulor fighting the war from there is clearly not working. It never has. More importantly, it never will.
    Afghanistan has never had a strong central government. A strategy in which the central government is the centerpiece of our counterinsurgency plan is destined to fail. It disenfranchises the very fabric of Afghan society. The tribal system in Afghanistan has taken a brutal beating for several decades. By supporting and giving some power back to the tribes, we can make positive progress in the region once again.
    Even the people who advise our national policymakers see the need to engage the tribes. “The Afghan government is not competent enough to deal with the dire threats that currently face Afghanistan,” says Seth Jones, an analyst at the RAND Corporation who advises the Pentagon. “This means working with tribal leaders.” (Jones 2008, Sappenfield 2008)
    I have fought on the battlefields of both Iraq and Afghanistan. Afghanistan is by far the more difficult and brutal operational environment. The enemy there