Why Beautiful People Have More Daughters: From Dating, Shopping, and Praying to Going to War and Becoming a Billionaire–Two Evolutionary Psychologists Explain Why We Do What We Do Read Free

believe that what is natural is good; that what is, ought to be. For example, one might commit the error of the naturalistic fallacy and say, “Because people are genetically different and endowed with different innate abilities and talents, they ought to be treated differently.”
    The moralistic fallacy , coined by the Harvard microbiologist Bernard Davis in the 1970s, 8 is the opposite of the naturalistic fallacy. It refers to the leap from ought to is , the claim that the way things should be is the way they are. This is the tendency to believe that what is good is natural; that what ought to be, is. For example, one might commit the error of the moralistic fallacy and say, “Because everybody ought to be treated equally, there are no innate genetic differences between people.” The science writer Matt Ridley calls it reverse naturalistic fallacy . 9
    Both are errors in thinking, and they get in the way of progress in science in general, and in evolutionary psychology in particular. However, as Ridley astutely points out, political conservatives are more likely to commit the naturalistic fallacy (“Nature designed men to be competitive and women to be nurturing, so women ought to stay home to take care of their children and leave politics to men”), while political liberals are equally likely to commit the moralistic fallacy (“The Western liberal democratic principles hold that men and women ought to be treated equally, and therefore men and women are biologically identical and any study that demonstrates otherwise is a priori false”). Since academics, and social scientists in particular, are generally left-leaning liberals, the moralistic fallacy has been a much greater problem in academic discussions of evolutionary psychology than the naturalistic fallacy. Most academics are above committing the naturalistic fallacy, but they are not above committing the moralistic fallacy.
    We will avoid both errors—both leaps of logic—in this book by never talking about what ought to be at all and only talking about what is. It is not possible to make either mistake if we never talk about ought . We will not draw moral conclusions from the empirical observations we describe in subsequent chapters, and we will not be guided in our observations by moral principles.
    There are only two legitimate criteria by which you may evaluate scientific ideas and theories: logic and evidence. Accordingly, you may justifiably criticize evolutionary psychological theories (including those presented in this book) if they are logically inconsistent within themselves or if there is credible scientific evidence against them. As scientists, we will take all such criticisms seriously. However, it would hardly be appropriate to criticize scientific theories simply because their implications are immoral, ugly, contrary to our ideals, or offensive to some. We can tell you right now that the implications of many of the ideas we present in this book (whether ours or someone else’s) are indeed immoral, ugly, contrary to our ideals, or offensive to either men or women (or some other groups of people). However, we must state them as they are because, to the best of our scientific judgment, they are true. That does not mean that we endorse all possible consequences and implications of our observations or believe that they are somehow good, right, desirable, or justifiable.
    Truth is the guiding principle in science, and it is the most important thing for scientists. We also believe that any solution to a social problem must start with the correct assessment of the problem itself and its possible causes. We can never devise a correct solution to a problem if we don’t know what its ultimate causes are. So the true observations are important foundations of both basic science and social policy.
    A Note about Stereotypes
    It would be tempting to dismiss many of our observations (such as answers to questions like,