War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942 Read Free

to be eliminated. Such hope could only be provided by Russia and the United States. Remove Russia and ‘Britain’s last hope would be shattered’. Mastery of Europe and the Balkans was the issue. The elimination of Russia would remove the United States too, because Japan’s power in the Far East would increase tremendously as a result. Halder scrawled an interim conclusion: ‘Decision: Russia’s destruction must therefore be made a part of the struggle. Spring 1941.’ (1)
    Hitler’s decision to invade Russia was not purely, or indeed primarily, motivated by his desire to knock Britain out of the war. Ideological considerations were the imperative powering conflict. These had been outlined in rambling and turgid form in
Mein Kampf
as early as 1925. Beneath the street dialogue terminology, of which Hitler was an acknowledged master, was a sinister causal chain that could only result in war against the Soviet Union. Race was the basic determinant of human civilisation. At one end of the spectrum stood the German nation, the embodiment and bastion of the Aryan race. At the lower end were the Jews, a parasitic and degenerative influence that threatened to destroy civilisation. German supremacy would be achieved first by destroying domestic political enemies and then by foreign conquest, eliminating the victors of World War 1. To reach their full potential, Aryan Germans needed to expand the geographic bounds of the Reich into the east, gaining
Lebensraum
(living space). The eventual aim was to create a German Empire from the Urals to Gibraltar, free of Jews, in which the
Untermenschen
(sub-human races) like Slavs would be subjected to Helot-like serfdom.
    By 1941 a substantial portion of the German population, including much of the officer corps, fully subscribed to this philosophical conception. Halder took notes at a two and a half hour meeting of some 200 high ranking officers and generals in the Führer’s office in Berlin during which ‘colonial tasks’, once the east had been subjugated, were discussed. Russia would be broken up: northern Russia to Finland, with protectorates established in the Baltic states, Ukraine and White Russia. Halder noted:
     
‘Clash of two ideologies. We must forget the concept of comradeship between soldiers. A communist is no comrade before or after the battle. This is a war of extermination… We do not wage war to preserve the enemy.’
     
    He recorded a series of brutal, yet hardly debated, directives under the precursor, ‘This war will be very different from the war in the West.’ The war against Russia would involve ‘extermination of the Bolshevist commissars and the communist intelligentsia’.
    The principles the staff officers were enjoined to embrace were to be reflected in future high command directives. ‘Commanders,’ Halder wrote, ‘must make the sacrifice of overcoming their personal scruples.’ (2) Many did.
    Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch, the German Army Commander-in-Chief, released a series of directives two months later to the rest of the Wehrmacht, defining their freedom of action in the coming war.
The Treatment of Enemy Inhabitants in the ‘Barbarossa’ Operational Zone,
released in May, was secret, and could only be communicated to officers. In essence it directed ‘pacification’ measures against any resistance in newly occupied areas, ‘which was to be eradicated promptly, severely and with maximum force’. Troops were given the ‘duty and right’ to ‘liquidate’ irregulars and saboteurs ‘in battle, or shoot them on the run’. Collective reprisals would be exacted from villages where resistance occurred. The infamous Commissar Order of 6 June was preceded by the introduction that ‘in a war against Bolshevism, handling the enemy according to humane rules or the Principles of International Law is not applicable’. Communists were not to be treated as conventional PoWs, ‘they are hitherto, whether in battle or found conducting