to wipe us out before we could mount a counteroffensive.
Thomas Stevenson:
Before we learned of the International Epidemiologist Conference’s winter meeting, we very seriously considered whether this was in fact an attack on the United States by a hostile party, either a nation state or a terrorist group. The problem was none of our chatter had indicated that something like this was in the offing, and this is, to be blunt, one of the things we had tuned ourselves to be looking for. It seemed unlikely to us that something of this scale could have been planned without our hearing of it. The enemies of the United States have a tendency to try to pump themselves up before an attempted attack. We didn’t pick up any gloating transmissions before Haden’s got onto our radar.
Even if Haden’s had been designed to attack the US, it was a very poor instrument for the task. We were hard hit by Haden’s first wave but we and most other western and industrialized countries immediately coordinated our responses and locked down further immediate spread of the disease. It was the places without the ability to effect a coordinated response where the disease really took a bite, both immediately and with the later stages.
This is why, on a personal note, I think biological warfare ultimately never caught on. Attempting to use a biological agent against your enemy while avoiding its effects on you is like trying to use a grenade by holding onto it and hoping all the shrapnel flies in the direction of the person you want to kill. You have to be stupid or suicidal to use biological weapons. Whoever invented Haden’s—if it was invented—was probably both.
Benjamin Moldanado:
Two weeks after Super Bowl Sunday we had a billion people infected worldwide, including fifty million in the United States—roughly one in seven people in both cases. By the end of four weeks it was two billion and eighty million. By the end of the year, 2.75 billion worldwide, ninety-five million in the US. One in three people across the planet got sick. 400 million died—one in every eighteen, just about.
Natasha Lawrence:
The irony today, if you want to call it that, is that people have almost forgotten just how genuinely terrifying that first stage of Haden’s was. Almost four million people died in the US alone, mostly in those first couple of months. That’s like wiping out the entire city of Los Angeles. In an average year, only about two and a half million people die in the US, total. We were barely equipped to deal with all the deaths, simply from the point of infrastructure.
Outside the US and industrialized nations the death toll was even higher as a percentage, and their ability to deal with the dead much lower. And that caused a huge number of problems in terms of secondary waves of disease, infection, and general political and social instability. As bad as it got for us, much of the planet had it much, much worse. There are places on the globe that still haven’t entirely recovered, either in population or in terms of social structures.
Irving Bennett:
Here’s an interesting fact that I learned from one of the anniversary stories coming up—it was only last year that the global population passed what it was when Haden’s first struck. They used to think we’d be at something over eight and a half billion people by now. We’re a billion and a quarter people short. That’s not just because Haden’s killed 400 million people. It’s that many of those 400 million were of childbearing age, and that in the aftermath of the disease, particularly in the developing world, a whole bunch more who would have been parents died in the messes that came after. There aren’t that many things that have ever put that much of a divot into humanity’s growth curve. The only other thing I can think of that most other people know about is the Black Death. That’s pretty impressive company, if “impressive” is the right word to use here.
And even
Tara Brown writing as Sophie Starr