The Battle of Britain Read Free

frontline strength as more than 900, including 150 bombers, 315 fighters, 325 reconnaissance, 100 liaison and 50 naval aircraft.
    The Polish combat aircraft were nowhere near as capable as those of the Luftwaffe. From the Luftwaffe strength given above and the specification of its aircraft given in a later chapter, it is clear that the Polish Air Force was at a huge disadvantage in numbers and in aircraft performance and armament.
    The Polish War Plan and General Directive for Air Operations, issued on July 28, 1939, laid down that fighter squadrons were to be used as anintegral part of the Armies, with the exception of the Pursuit Brigade, consisting of five squadrons, which was to be under the control of the Supreme Commander of the Polish Forces. The tasks for the Army fighter squadrons (known as the Army Air Force) were: interception of enemy aircraft over the Army sector, air cover of Polish aircraft operating over the Army sector, and in critical situations, air attacks on enemy ground forces. The task of the Pursuit Brigade was air defence of the country.
    The eight squadrons operating with the four Armies covered large sectors but had no radio, and therefore no co-operation with, or information from, the ground when airborne. Enemy activity was so intense, however, that most take-offs were followed by combat. The rapid advance of the German Army and the Luftwaffe’s attacks on airfields necessitated frequent changes of base. Heavy losses of aircrew and aircraft were suffered on the ground and in the air.
    After 12 days the Army Air Force ceased to operate effectively and was withdrawn to join the remnants of the Pursuit Brigade. There was one exception: the Poznan Army Wing, commanded by Major M. Mumler, fought until September 16, 1939. It shot down 31 enemy aircraft, lost two pilots killed, four wounded and six missing, and lost all but one of its aircraft. This last, flown by the commanding officer, landed in Romania on September 18 – all that remained of an initial strength of 22.
    The Pursuit Brigade was based on airfields near Warsaw to defend the capital and its environs. Eight radio stations provided a means of communication and control, although the radio range was only 9 to 12 miles (15 to 20km). The Warsaw surveillance centre provided information on the enemy. On September 7 the Brigade, with 16 serviceable aircraft, was moved to the Lublin area, to be joined later by the surviving pilots and aircraft of the Army squadrons. The combined fighter force, short of fuel and deprived of adequate communication, shot down only five enemy aircraft between September 7 and 17, after which the Polish Air Force ceased to operate. The Polish Army fought on until October 3.
    It is customary to dismiss the performance of the Polish Air Force with the statement that it was wiped out on the ground before it could put up a fight. As the foregoing proves, this is wildly inaccurate and a calumny on brave men who died disproving it, and on those who survived to fight on in the RAF.
    The Luftwaffe suffered 285 aircraft destroyed and 279 severely damaged; 189 Luftwaffe aircrew were killed, 224 missing and 126 wounded.
    Out of 435 aircraft engaged, the Polish Air Force lost 327 from all causes, of which 264 were by direct enemy action, destroyed in combat or on the ground; at least 33 were shot down by their own anti-aircraft gun fire and 116 escaped to Romania. Aircrew killed and missing numbered at least 234.
    The experience of 18 days’ hard air fighting contributed nothing to help the RAF in the Battle of Britain. The German aircraft destroyed and aircrew killed or disabled were more than replaced by then. The disparity between the quality and quantity of the Polish and British fighters was obvious: the Polish PZL P7s and P11s had been at a crippling disadvantage, but if Germany had attacked Britain then, Hurricanes and Spitfires would have mauled the Luftwaffe.
    Although scores of Polish fighter pilots managed to