assassinations was by nature a reserved and controlled man, in addition to which the meeting was being held in the office of the KGB chairman himself, which had an intimidating effect.
It was the chairman, General Valery Kalenin, who opened the discussion.
âThe decision is a simple one,â he said. âDo we abort the assassination? Or do we let it proceed?â
Chapter Two
General Valery Kalenin was a small, saturnine man whose life had been devoted to Soviet intelligence. He had controlled it through two major leadership upheavals in the Politburo, which now regarded him with the respect of people well aware â because heâd made sure they were aware â that he had embarrassing files upon all of them, like Americaâs Edgar Hoover had retained unchallenged his control of the FBI with his tittle-tale dossiers upon US Congressmen and presidents. Kalenin had been a young and never-suspected overseas agent in Washington during the last year of Hooverâs reign and had been unimpressed by the ability of the countryâs counter-intelligence service. Heâd applauded the advantage of incriminating information, though, and followed Hooverâs example when he had gained the ultimate promotion to Dzerzhinsky Square. Although he had taken the precaution Kalenin was unsure if he would ever use it as a defence, because he found the idea of blackmail distasteful, like he found assassination distasteful. The defection was a good enough excuse to abandon the idea but Kalenin, a forever cautious man, thought there might also be a good and protective reason to let it run.
Although the question had been put more to Berenkov than to the head of the assassination division, it was Lvov who responded. âA great deal of planning and effort has gone into the operation,â he said, an ambitious man defending something personally his.
âTo how much did Novikov have access?â demanded Kalenin.
âCertainly sufficient to know that an assassination was being planned,â said Berenkov. In contrast to Kalenin, the head of the First Chief Directorate was a bulge-stomached, florid-faced man.
âBut little more than that,â argued Lvov, who was aware of the importance the Kremlin attached to the assassination and even more aware of the benefit of being recognized its creator.
âWeâve traced three cables Novikov enciphered,â said Berenkov. âOne specifically talked of the value to be gained from a political killing.â
âThere was no identification of the target,â insisted Lvov.
âThere is in the Politburo Minute,â said Berenkov. âAnd Novikov was security-cleared for Politburo traffic.â
Kalenin, who was conscious of the differing attitudes between the two men confronting him, said: âIs there any proof of Novikov having seen the Politburo document?â
Berenkov shook his head, almost angrily. âSecurity in the Kremlin is a joke,â he said. âThere is no system, like we have here, of signature acknowledgement of handling. Maybe he did, maybe he didnât. The only way weâll ever know is to go ahead and find theyâre waiting for us. And then it will be too late.â
âYou think we should abort then?â demanded Kalenin. There was no other officer in the KGB whom Kalenin respected more than Alexei Berenkov. Like Kalenin, Berenkov had been a brilliant overseas operative â controlling five European cells under his cover as a London wine merchant â and endured English imprisonment until an exchange had been arranged, back to Moscow, where he had proven himself to be an even more brilliant headquarters official and planner.
âI know how important the mission is regarded,â said Berenkov. âI know, too, how much organization and time has gone into setting it up. But I think the risk of it being compromised outweighs every consideration.â
Lvov, who had anticipated