Presidential Lottery Read Free

else who appreciated the possibilities. That Governor Wallace might wind up with a sizable block of votes which he could throw either way was probable. That Wallace could exercise any leverage if the election were thrown into the House seemed unlikely, in that no candidates for the House were running on the Wallace ticket nor were any publicly pledged to him; the decision there could be made apart from Wallace, so if he wished to exercise definitive leverage he had to do it promptly and in the Electoral College. Finally, since electors could do anything they pleased, and since Wallace would have a strong hold on his, I had to conclude that the Wallace threat was real, it was legal, and it could be accomplished. George Wallace could actually dictate who our President was to be. Furthermore, he had given adequate warning of his intentions.
    As early as May, 1967, he had outlined his Presidential strategy in an interview with the
Richmond News
: “I mightnot have any chance in the House. But before you go to the House you go to the Electoral College. If we held the balance of power, we may decide the question in the Electoral College because one party may have to make a concession to the people of our country, a solemn covenant to them.” Wallace went on to explain that he had used the phrase “solemn covenant” because “the word
deal
doesn’t sound too good.”
    “Godamightydamn!” Wallace cried later. “Wouldn’t it be sump’n if we win?” In Pittsburgh he spelled out the covenant that he would offer Nixon and Humphrey, if he succeeded in drawing off enough votes to wield a balance of power. Some of his ideas were reasonable, such as insistence on a better enforcement of laws; most were extraordinary, such as the abandonment of any type of civil rights legislation.
    Ed Ewing, a top Wallace aide, explained how the covenant was to work. Each man or woman across the nation nominated by Wallace to stand as one of his electors would sign a notarized affidavit that he would vote, not the way his state voted, but the way Governor Wallace directed him to vote. With these pledged votes that could be swung either to Nixon or Humphrey, Wallace could go to those candidates and ask, “What will you give me if I make you President?”
    Ewing pointed out that this was perfectly legal, because of our fifty states, only sixteen had laws requiring their electors to vote the way their state voted, and not one of these was a state where Wallace was likely to win. Furthermore, as we have seen, the laws were probably unconstitutional. “And anyway,” Ewing added, “there’s not much they could do after the fact.”
    Would Wallace’s daring plan have worked? Both Nixon and Humphrey volunteered that they would not accept a deal with Wallace. However, Professor James C. Kirby, Jr., of Northwestern University, a leading authority on electoral reform, pointed out, “Such promises are good intentions which may more easily be stated in August than honored in November. The major candidate who was otherwise certain to lose in the House would be under tremendous pressure to negotiate with Wallace.”
    In early September, when it had looked as if the Republicans would easily gain control of the House, so that if a close electoral vote did develop, Nixon would be assured of election by the new House, my Republican friends told me, “Nixon would never make a deal with Wallace, but Humphrey might.” In late October, when it seemed likely that the Democrats were going to retain control of the House, my Democratic friends told me, “Humphrey will never surrender to Wallace, but Nixon might.”
    My own conclusion was that in the forty days between the popular vote on November 5 and the electoral vote on December 16, pressures would become so tremendous and the stakes so compelling—the Presidency of the most powerful functioning democracy on earth, with all the prerogatives that position entails—that any man or party might be tempted beyond