Hitler's Charisma Read Free

pavement, for instance, they came along with their riding crop and you had to step down onto the street … There was quite a bit of harassment.” And as well as coping with the French in the Ruhr, the population of Germany had to somehow carry on functioning under the pressure of hyperinflation. “In 1923,” recalls Rüdiger, “an exercise book cost about three billion marks, I think.”
    Hitler did not call on his supporters to take part in the passive resistance that some Germans were mounting against the French in the Ruhr. His focus remained on building on the inspiration of Mussolini’s example in Italy. But he realised that he needed at least the tacit support of the
Reichswehr
, the German Armed Forces, in his quest to overthrow the government in Berlin. Yet in May 1923, when as a first step towards nationalrevolution the Nazis attempted to stir up soldiers of the
Reichswehr
who were parading on the Oberwiesenfeld in Munich, their approaches were comprehensively rejected. Nonetheless, Hitler believed he had to act. Who knew how long the crisis would last? And so in November 1923 he launched the Beer Hall Putsch—an event that was to gain Hitler national publicity for the first time, though not in the way he had anticipated.
    It wasn’t obvious to anyone involved in the planning of the putsch whether or not Hitler really was the “heroic” equivalent of Mussolini. Hitler was in discussion with General Erich Ludendorff, hero of the German victory at Tannenberg in the First World War, about his potential involvement in a Nazi-inspired revolution, but it was never made explicit exactly what Ludendorff’s role would be. Was Ludendorff to be just the military leader, with Hitler the political head of the revolution, or was Ludendorff the real “hero” for whom Hitler had merely been preparing the way?
    What was clear, however, was that by the end of 1923 Hitler had decided to seize the initiative. The plan was simple—force the leaders of the authoritarian government of Bavaria to declare their support for a Naziled “march on Berlin” to overthrow the “November criminals” who were in power. Since it was obvious that the Nazis needed the assistance—or at the very least the acquiescence—of the Bavarian state security forces as well as Bavarian political leaders, Hitler decided that the coup should be attempted whilst the “state commissioner” of Bavaria, Gustav von Kahr, was speaking at a meeting at the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich. Kahr was effectively the dictator of Bavaria, and had been appointed in September 1923 in response to a crisis in government in Berlin caused by the threat once again of revolution.
    There were some signs that perhaps Hitler’s strategy might succeed—the Bavarian Government, for example, seemed more sympathetic to the Nazis than the authorities in other German states. The Nazis had been banned in much of the rest of Germany after the murder of Walther Rathenau, the Jewish Foreign Minister of Germany, the year before. But in Bavaria the Nazis were still able to function and Kahr shared Hitler’s contempt for the government in Berlin.
    It was to the Nazis’ advantage to make their move at Kahr’s meeting since both the Head of the Bavarian Police, Hans von Seisser, and the commander of the German Army in Bavaria, General Otto von Lossow,would also be present. Hitler’s gamble was that, presented with a fait accompli, all of these leading figures would go along with his planned revolution.
    So, at around 8:20 p.m. on 8 November 1923, Hitler and more than a dozen supporters, including Hermann Göring, Rudolf Hess and Alfred Rosenberg, forced their way into the Bürgerbräukeller whilst Kahr was speaking to an audience of several thousand. Outside the beer hall, units of the SA guarded the exits. After a shot had been fired into the ceiling of the beer hall, Hitler announced that the revolution had begun. He and his comrades then hustled the key figures of the