Bootleggers & Baptists: How Economic Forces and Moral Persuasion Interact to Shape Regulatory Politics Read Free Page B

deserves attention. Illuminating the dimensions of that imprint is the underlying purpose of this introductory chapter.
    The chapter is organized into four parts. First, we introduce the Bootlegger/Baptist dynamic. In this part, we examine the growth of social regulation that has emerged because of Bootlegger/Baptist interaction and the impact of these relationships on economic performance. We explain how Bootlegger forces largely define how the regulation advocated by Baptist interest groups actually comes about in practice. The new set of opportunities afforded by social regulation biases the behavior of corporate leaders away from producing more and better goods and services in favor of regulation-seeking activities that reduce output. Then, we break down examples of social regulation into four modes of Bootlegger and Baptist interaction: (a) covert, (b) noncooperative, (c) cooperative, and (d) coordinated. We use these labels throughout the book to organize our various examples and episodes of Bootlegger/Baptist activity. Finally, we close out the chapter—as we do each chapter—with concluding thoughts.
    The Bootlegger/Baptist Dynamic
    The Bootlegger/Baptist theory provides a useful device for explaining crucial features of enduring social regulations that affect consumers and producers worldwide. The theory describes how special interest groups acquire gains through the political process, and why these two types of interest groups become more prevalent and vocal. Politicians are agents who serve the competing goals and objectives of special interest groups as well as the broader unorganized public. Bootlegger/Baptist theory tells a story of how public interest justification greases the rails for purely private pursuits.
    Gifted politicians who seek to serve their constituencies can do more for economic interest groups if their actions can be clothed in public interest garb (Simmons, Yonk, and Thomas 2011). Politicians will rarely explain an effort to improve the profits of an economic interest group by saying, “I was just trying to help a good firm make more money.” The Bootlegger/Baptist theory explains how the cost of organizing demand for political action can be reduced while at the same time easing the politician’s burden when it comes time to justify those actions. When Bootleggers and Baptists unite, activity in the market for regulation flourishes.
    We should hardly be surprised by private pursuit of regulatory benefits. None other than the patron saint of economics, Adam Smith, warned about efforts by early industrialists to seek political favors through laws and regulations. As Smith wrote in his magnum opus, The Wealth of Nations ([1776] 1827, 107):
    The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.
    Writing in 1776, Adam Smith had apparently not encountered situations where businesspersons were joined by clergy and others who wrapped the political enterprise in an attractive moral cloak, thereby improving the chances that politicians would respond favorably to their high-sounding petitions.
    The government “pork” Bootleggers seek—with the witting or unwitting assistance of Baptists—can take myriad forms. The most straightforward example of Bootlegger/Baptist activity occurs when some private interest seeks a direct benefit from government—such as a subsidy, contract, or special tax break—on the premise that some higher moral aim or public interest will thereby be served. In these cases, nominal rivals