Avengers and Philosophy: Earth's Mightiest Thinkers, The Read Free

over time cannot be the same thing that makes a superhero identical to himself or herself over time; otherwise we would have difficulty saying that Goliath and the Wasp are not identical superhero identities (even though they both may have been assumed by the same person). On the other hand, Captain America is one superhero identity that has been assumed by Steve Rogers (most prominently) and also by others such as John Walker and Bucky Barnes. If Captain America were just a body, or just a certain group of psychological features, it would not be possible for different people (who have different physical and psychological characteristics) to “be” him. But clearly there have been multiple people, all going by the name “Captain America,” so we need a new theory of identity.
     
    What should we say about superhero identity if it is not the same thing as personal identity? One possibility would be to draw from the way we talk about superheroes and apply it to the approach we use with personal identity, respecting the fact that it is a different sort of thing to be a superhero than to be a person. Being a superhero is like being a persona , or wearing a mantle , like when we say, “David Bowie shed the mantle of Ziggy Stardust in the early 1970s, adopting a few years later the persona of the Thin White Duke.” Bowie created his personas as a performance artist, and they were something more than just Bowie himself—they were associated with certain features that went beyond the person playing them.
     
    What is it about a mantle that allows for its continuity over a span of time? If it is not just the body or the personality wearing it, what is it that is essential to being a superhero? Two different features stand out when we pose the question this way. One is that a superhero mantle must be of the appropriate kind ; that is, it must be the mantle of a superhero. The second feature is that the bearer of a superhero mantle must have a certain legitimacy. Not just anyone can put on a Captain America uniform and actually be Captain America; there is a process that must be followed to become certain superheroes. Both of these features—appropriateness and legitimacy—take us beyond the kinds of theories we see for personal identity.
     
    Let’s explore these two features in a bit more detail. The aspect of appropriateness of a mantle is just the kind of role that we traditionally associate with superheroes. For one thing, there must be some form of superpower or extraordinary ability associated with it, such as superstrength, lightning speed, extraordinary proficiency with a weapon, and so on. A superhero needs to be extraordinary in some form or other. A superhero must also be a hero under some reasonable description, to distinguish superheroes from supervillains. So by “appropriate” I just mean what we would expect—a superhero mantle is one that is associated with some extraordinary ability (or abilities) and some kind of heroism, the reason we call that person a superhero.
     
    The issue of what it is to “legitimately” bear such a mantle is difficult to specify, but we can think of a superhero mantle along the lines of intellectual property. If I invent a new product, I have a legitimate claim to that product, by virtue of the fact that it is my own creation; or if I create some kind of art, I likewise bear a legitimate claim to that art. The David Bowie example illustrates this point well, because he has the only legitimate claim to his Ziggy Stardust mantle. He could perhaps pass it on to someone else who could give concerts or make albums as Ziggy Stardust, but it would be illegitimate if someone did so without Bowie’s blessing (that is, we wouldn’t think that such a person would really be Ziggy Stardust, as Bowie was). More generally, the legitimacy of a mantle can be traced to its source or pedigree; the person has to have “earned” the mantle, either by creating it or having it bestowed upon him