Anzac's Dirty Dozen Read Free

involved. Although the RAN Bridging Train served throughoutthe Gallipoli campaign, for example, it was numerically a much smaller organisation than the army units. During World War I, almost 417 000 men – over half of the eligible white male population – enlisted in the Australian armed forces, the overwhelming majority in the army. 3 The Navy had 3800 personnel at the start of this war, and over 5000 at the end. Of the 55 306 Australians who died in the conflict of 1914–1918, only 108 served in the RAN. 4 This theme of relative size is consistent throughout the twentieth century: in World War II the Navy was much larger, peaking at about 40 413 personnel in June 1945, but the peak size of the army was around 542 000 in August 1943 and the Royal Australian Air Force’s reached close to 182 000 people in August 1944. 5 As a result, through the last century of Australian history the pool of people with direct experience of the Navy is relatively small and this has mattered as far as historical attention is concerned.
    This issue of relative size is given further emphasis if the Navy’s history is narrowly cast on operational subjects, because it leaves out so many parts of the service’s history. For example, navies are capital- and technology-intensive organisations and their operational effectiveness is directly related to the efficiency and appropriateness of their industrial support base. But the understanding of the impact of industrial and dockyard activities on the effectiveness of the Australian Navy has never been systematically studied. Another example is the extent to which the Navy has mirrored Australian national priorities: ships are discrete units and their location and employment quickly and directly reflect the priorities of the government. The Australian Navy is no different to other navies in this respect but – in an echo of the ‘other people’s wars’ myth discussed by Craig Stockings in Chapter 4 – the prevailing impression is that the Royal Navy and British associations have predominated to the detriment of Australian interests. Thisimpression is not accurate, but a broader study, assessing Australian national interests and how the Navy has supported them, is another important area of investigation which has never been studied consistently, let alone comprehensively.
    Furthermore, the location of naval operations has tended to diminish public knowledge and awareness of them, as they usually occur out of sight, often far from Australia. The Japanese submarine attacks in Sydney Harbour, for example, are an exception not the rule. Those parts of naval operations that do occur where they can be observed, such as harbour defences and minesweeping, are performed by small, slow and outwardly unimpressive vessels, while the conduct of the operations themselves is painstaking and focused below the water. As a consequence, these tend not to be parts of naval history that capture much attention from naval historians, let alone the broader public.
    A second aspect of the location of maritime operations that tends to militate against broad public engagement is the ephemeral nature of the naval battlefield. It is possible to visit many terrestrial battlefields, and the topography and features of those battlefields are often still visible, can be photographed and disseminated broadly. An interested person can start to appreciate what the battle might have been like. The naval battlefield by contrast is much more difficult to visit. Even to a trained eye, one patch of ocean is much like another and the battle is defined by the presence of the warships, most of which have moved on after the battle and left few traces behind. Even the warship crews present at such battles have greatly differing perspectives, each of which are equally valid, but incomplete. The majority would have served below decks and may have heard a great deal, but not seen anything beyond the next