A Just Cause Read Free Page A

the committee rules. “Our rules are very different from what happens in the places, the venues where you ordinarily ply your trade,” she said (61). Her condescending tone was not lost on Genson or the audience. The legislative committee was not dealing with routine policy matters—it was considering a criminal complaint brought by the US Attorney’s Office, administrative indiscretions, and possible malfeasance. Genson was a criminal defense attorney. He was not acting to inform public policy, but as an attorney appearing before the committee to address the criminal complaint brought against the governor of Illinois. Currie’s attitude toward Genson might also have been a defensive maneuver. She was aware of the wily Genson’s reputation. He was one of the best, always probing, sometimes with indignation, sometimes feigning a confused and befuddled manner to throw his opponents off guard. Currie was not going to allow courtroom theatrics. She made it clear from the start—she was going to run the hearings.
    Taken aback, Genson replied indignantly, “I ply my trade in many places” (61). The experienced courtroom lawyer quickly regained his comportment and questioned why there was nothing in the rules that addressed the vagueness of the Illinois Constitution in regard to “standard of proof” or the “basis for impeachment.” Currie was not about to debate the adequacy of the Constitution or let Genson control the discussion; either would have been problematic. She informed Genson that the Constitution was clear: “Impeachment is appropriate if there is cause for impeachment” (62). The exchange between Currie and Genson was followed by a short but restrained partisan debate regarding the committee makeup and the power to subpoena witnesses that was provided in the committee’s rules. Predictably, the rules were adopted by a straight-line party vote, all twelve Democrats voting yes and all nine Republicans voting no (68–72).
    Genson earlier had filed a motion with the committee to request that it appoint counsel for the governor. By appointing counsel, the state would then be responsible for attorney fees, thereby relieving Blagojevich of having to incur personal legal fees. The request was a long shot, but Genson tried. When describing the committee’s exhibits, Currie addressed Genson’s motion. She informed Genson that the motion was inappropriate and thatthe committee would not take it up. The proper place to request the motion, she told Genson, was with the state Attorney General’s Office. Genson replied that he had already filed a motion with the attorney general (72).
    Currie informed the audience that the day would be devoted to considering the criminal complaint submitted by the US attorney. But before the criminal complaint could be presented, Genson interrupted and asked that committee members Jill Tracy, Jack Franks, and William Black be precluded from participating in the hearing. He said that those three members, in remarks they had made the day before, had “made it perfectly clear that they already made up their mind in this case” regarding the governor’s guilt or innocence (75). He stressed that in the previous day’s discussions, the attitude echoed by several members of the committee was that due process should prevail, and if due process was to prevail, committee members should approach their task with an open mind. In a court of law Genson’s argument would have had merit, but this was a hearing in the Illinois legislature, a procedure not subject to any provisions of the law. Currie responded that the extent of due process was the committee’s prerogative, and she rejected Genson’s proposal.
    The experienced defense attorney had one more motion, this one pertaining to procedural substance. He pointed out that he had received just a one-day notification of the hearing, that he had received