A Just Cause Read Free Page B

“no list of witnesses,” and that he had not had the time to identify and subpoena witnesses. He asked that the hearing be adjourned to give him “appropriate time to prepare” (77). The audience followed Genson’s performance with fascination. The decisions of the chairperson were predetermined—everyone knew that—and there was no question that the outcome of the hearings would be a recommendation to impeach. But Genson’s blend of strategy, theater, and knowledge of the law provided an intriguing spectacle. Most in the audience knew of Ed Genson’s reputation; his past clients had received much attention in the press. Now, as they observed the drama unfolding before them, they seemed both amused and captivated.
    Currie again rejected Genson’s motion and repeated that the subject of the day’s hearing would be the criminal complaint. She reminded Genson that he was Blagojevich’s attorney and said she assumed that he had read the complaint, in particular the sections dealing with Blagojevich fund-raisers Ali Ata and Joe Cari. 9 She reminded Genson that he did not have subpoena power and said she doubted that the committee would give it to him. Currie stated again, “We are not subject to the kinds of rulesthat might apply in a courtroom” (77). It was important that the committee proceed with the inquiry, she said. Genson quickly countered that accepting the criminal complaint as a basis for the committee’s inquiry was a violation of the US criminal code, and he read a portion of the code supporting his position. He claimed that he had not been presented with the tapes or documents, so there was no way they could test the material at this point to consider whether the criminal complaint was illegal (79). Without addressing the substance of Genson’s claim, Currie simply informed him again that the committee was not a court and asked Ellis to present the criminal complaint.
    Taking a position at the witness table, Ellis began to summarize the seventy-six-page criminal complaint filed by the US attorney that had prompted Blagojevich’s arrest. According to the criminal complaint, the US government had been investigating the Blagojevich administration since 2003 and Rod Blagojevich had attempted to gain financial benefits for appointments to state boards and commissions, state employment, and state contracts; had attempted to access state funds; had threatened to withhold Illinois Financial Authority (IFA) assistance from the Tribune Company with regard to the sale of Wrigley Field unless the company fired members of the editorial board of its newspaper, the Chicago Tribune ; and—the most damning charge—had attempted to trade the appointment of the US Senate seat vacated by Barack Obama. 10 Ellis took note of House Bill (HB) 824, legislation banning large contributions from state contractors who received contracts worth $50,000 or more to the state officeholders who awarded the contract. 11 He explained that the bill would become law on January 1, 2009, and that Blagojevich had “accelerated his efforts to get as much money as he could” before the law went into effect. “On the basis of that information, the government obtained court approval to intercept oral communications in certain locations of the offices of Friends of Blagojevich,” Ellis said. (Friends of Blagojevich was the name of the account used for expenses and donations to the governor for political activities.) It was during the monitoring of communications regarding efforts to accumulate contributions before that date that the government uncovered “three different areas of criminal conduct”: the attempts to obtain campaign contributions for official acts, to extort the Tribune Company, and to trade the appointment to the US Senate seat in return for something of personal value (85).
    Methodically, Ellis summarized the criminal complaint, taking care to