Vietnam II: A War Novel Episode 3 (V2) Read Free Page B

of post-Cold War planners the buildup of ground forces for Jungle Storm demonstrated that sizable U.S. ground forces and major deployments would still be required.  In the Pacific Theater, unlike Europe, with the exception of Korea, the U.S. did not have significant ground forces or equipment on scene and ready to go.  With the escalating threat of hostilities in the fall of 1990 the U.S. was faced with a major expeditionary operation that was not anticipated and in which speed of deployment was potentially crucial to the lives of the POWs.
    The U.S. military was generally well prepared for a major deployment.  Major improvements in expeditionary capabilities were instituted in the 1980s providing a solid expeditionary force structure on which to base JUNGLE STORM.   The specific mobility highlights of the program included the following:
    The AFLOAT PREPOSITIONED SHIPS (APS) which were ships, carrying ordnance, supplies as well as fuel for the Army and Air Force, plus a naval field hospital ship. These ships are manned by civilian crews on a continuous basis under contract to the Military Sealift Command.  Most of the ships used for the V2 buildup came from the fleet at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
    The MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIPS (MPS) which were ships carrying unit equipment and 30 days of supplies for three Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs).  These ships sailed from Guam the day after the embargo started. 
    The improved C-5B GALAXY airlifter was the biggest plane in the DOD fleet.  The Air Force upgraded the C-5 airlifter and the newer version doubled the size of the C-5 fleet, giving the U.S. an increased capacity to move heavy cargo via air.
    Finally the READY RESERVE FORCE (RRF) was used extensively.  Many troops sailed to V1 in an aging mothballed fleet of WWII era cargo ships.  At the end of the war, the Navy began looking for newer ships to replace the antiques.  Over the next ten years, the RRF grew to 96 ships including roll on/roll-off ships, barge carriers, bulk ships and small tankers.  These ships are maintained at various U.S. ports by the Maritime Administration without crews, in an inactive status.  The RRF program was built to activate the ships in 5, 10, or 20 days depending on readiness status.  On C-day an activation order was received and the RRF ships were towed to a shipyard for mechanical preparation to sail.  Then the merchant marines were contacted to produce crews.
    The Joint Force concept dominated the strategic deployment of all assets.  Army Airborne Divisions were the first to arrive via Air Force airlift to provide an initial presence and to provide additional security at the air bases and airports that would be used for the operation.  The Army did not rely on their own previsions, but on provisions from the Marine Corps.  They were quickly reinforced by MEBs as well as Mechanized Divisions coming via sealift. 
    The bulk of the soldiers were flown to the Pacific.  Their heavy gear was not.  With the exception of the Airborne Divisions, strategic sealift brought the Army’s weapons and equipment to them.
    During WWII, Korea and V1, sealift was heavily dependent on the U.S. flag fleet and the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) of World War II-era Liberty and Victory ships.  This changed in the late 1970’s when the procurement of newer APS, FSS, and RRF ships became necessary due to the deteriorating conditions of the NDRF.  Sealift forces were sized for a global war growing out of a conflict against the Soviet Union with the Persian Gulf in mind.  The eight SL-7 fast sealift ships were specifically designed for rapid deployment of a heavy division.  This fit the initial Jungle Storm deployments well.  A heavy division was moved to the Guam in days even though no real thought or plans had been put into place to put troops on the ground in Vietnam.  The further deployment of other divisions would depend on activation of the U.S. flag ships in the