the Congress. It then examines ways the Bush PASs related to one another within and across executive agencies. It revisits the theory of village-like isolation of PASs and how this was overcome in twelve years of Republican lease on the White House.
Chapter 10 offers advice to future PASs from the Bush PASs, conclusions from this study, and implications for the ongoing institution of presidential appointments in the federal government. It also suggests areas of future study regarding the appointment system and its products, the PASs.
The appendices discuss the methodologies employed in the study of the Bush PASs and reprint the Bush PAS Survey with the raw response data. They also detail the name, title, executive level or designation, and agency of those interviewed in conjunction with this project and the questions addressed in the confidential interviews with the PASs and others.
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Presidential Appointees in the Modern Era: Political and Bureaucratic Context
Franklin Delano Roosevelt inaugurated the modern presidency that heralded an unbroken trend toward centralization of the institution of the presidency. This centralization featured control over a growing government bureaucracy exercised by an expanding White House bureaucracy. Increasing demands on modern government produced the administrative state and an expanded federal bureaucracy in both the political and career camps to meet those demands.
Beyond merely moving in tandem with the growth of government, the presidency in this era has evolved into an administrative force of its own whose directors seek greater control over government's bureaucracy for increased command of both budget and policy. The centralized presidency that resulted from this political growth has both positive and negative ramifications for the efficient and effective governance of the nation.
Focused on interbureaucratic issues, this chapter sets out the background political and bureaucratic contexts in which modern governance occurs. It discusses the role of the Congress in the bureaucratic dance, the constitutional separation of powers, the politics/administration dichotomy, and the administrative state. It looks at the benefits and costs of the administrative presidency, particularly as practiced by Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan (its prime exemplars), and the ongoing trend toward centralizing and bureaucratizing the presidency.
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Relations Between the Executive and Legislative Branches
Just as the nation's history impacts the role of the bureaucracy, relations between the executive agencies and the Congress are not unaffected by that same history. As some have noted, the Revolutionary War, with its battle cry of "No taxation without representation!" was, in essence, a revolt against the executive, as embodied in George III's colonial officers. The new nation's constitution reflected this anti-executive bias in the pride of place it gave to the Congress, the closest thing to the Continental Congress. The legislative branch was allotted far more attention as to its powers, rules, and duties than was the executive branch.
Furthermore, the Constitution was "conspicuously mute" on the subject of administration of the government's bureaucracy:
The Constitution makes no mention of "administration" or "management" and refers sparingly to "executing the laws." . . . The Constitutional Framers were not necessarily against strong, efficient management, although suspicion of British executive excesses still ran strong. [However,] the role of administration was perceived differently at a time when members of Congress outnumbered the entire executive branch workforce in Washington. Constitutional machinery was designed for its time, before the onslaught of modernizing and bureaucratizing forces. (Garnett 1987, 35-36)
Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the Continental Congress carried total responsibility for executive, judicial, and legislative functions for the new union.