as there have been mobs. Thatâs why my mom used to ask, in response to my whine that âeveryone else is [doing, saying, believing] somethingâ that, âIf everyone jumped off a bridge, would you jump off too?â Well, hopefullynot, but the history of humanity might suggest otherwise. We not only tend to follow othersâ actions, we also seem all too willing to go along with what they believe. We trust their testimony, even when we shouldnât.
My momâs skepticism about the reliability of testimony has deep roots in our culture. The seventeenth-century philosopher John Locke snarled at the idea that you can know something merely because someone else tells you: âI hope it will not be thought arrogance to say,â he begins, âthat perhaps we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge if we sought it in the fountain . . . of things in themselves, and made use rather of our own thoughts than other menâs to find it.â He goes on, âThe floating of other menâs opinions in our brains makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science is in us but opiniatrety.â 8 Lockeâs point seems to be that real knowledge only comes from your own personal observations, or use of your memory, logical reasoning, or so on. Real knowers, he seems to say, are self-reliant: they drink from the fountain of âthings in themselves.â That is, they believe only when they have, or least can easily obtain, reasonsâreasons based on personal observations and critical thinkingâfor one side of the given issue or another.
An emphasis on self-reliance makes sense given that Locke was a founding figure of the Enlightenment, known for celebrating the individualâs political rights and autonomy. For Locke, citizens had a natural right to their property, and the government needed to be relatively standoffish with regard to how people used that property. This trumpeting of the rights of the individual had a natural epistemic correlate, call it Lockeâs command: thou shalt figure things out thyself. The sentiment is echoed again and again throughout the period. Kant, in fact, defined enlightenment partly in terms of it: as humanityâs âemergence from a self-imposed immaturityââimmaturity due to lack of courage to think for oneself as opposed to going with the flow. 9 One could not even enter the British Royal Society without passing under their motto (then and now) of nullius in verba (âtake nobodyâs word for itâ).
These sentiments were largely a reaction to an older ideaâthat all knowledge requires deferring to, and trusting, authority. Education in the sixteenth century was still very much a matter of mastering certain religious and classical texts, and what you knew came from those, and only those, texts. But as it became apparent that these texts were often wrong (think of Galileoâs and Copernicusâ discoveries, for example) the method of consulting them for knowledge came to seem naive. Thus by 1641, we find Descartes wiping away such methods with the very first sentence of his most famous book: âSome years ago I was struck by the large numbers of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had subsequently based on them.â 10 Descartes sat down and attempted to reconstruct what he really knewâusing only materials that he could find with his own mindâand he implicitly urged his reader to do the same. In other words, donât trust someone elseâs say-so; question authority.
This is still good adviceâto a point. Thatâs because, really, âLockeâs commandâ is impossible to follow strictly. We canâtfigure everything out for ourselves. So, if we interpret Locke as telling us that you only really know that which you