avoided minefields and had deep gullies to mask their approach. They would breach the outer wall by crawling through a drainage ditch on the airport side.
A second group planned to roll quietly toward the front gate in two vehicles. They would carry silenced pistols to take out two guards at the entrance. Meanwhile, the other attackers would have burst into the several small huts where bin Laden’s wives slept. When they found the tall, bearded Saudi, they would cuff him, drag him toward the gate and load him into a Land Cruiser. Other vehicles back at the rally point would approach in sequence, and together they would go to the provisioned cave about 30 miles away.
Satellite photography and reports from the ground indicated that there were dozens of women and children living at Tarnak. Langley asked members of the tribal team to explain in detail how they planned to minimize harm to bystanders during their assault.
The CIA officers involved thought their agents were serious, semiprofessional fighters who were trying to cooperate as best they could. Yet “if you understood the Afghan mind-set and the context,” recalled an officer involved, it was clear that in any raid the Afghans would probably fire indiscriminately at some point.
In Washington, Richard Clarke, the White House counterterrorism coordinator, drove out to Langley to meet with his CIA counterpart, O’Connell, who briefed him on the details of the Tarnak attack plan and how much it would cost. O’Connell also outlined the political risks, including the potential problem of civilian casualties.
Members of the White House counterterrorism team reacted skeptically. Their sense was that the TRODPINT agents were old anti-Soviet mujaheddin who had long since passed their peak fighting years and were probably milking the CIA for money while minimizing the risks they took on the ground. If they did go through with a Tarnak raid, women and children would die and bin Laden would probably escape, some White House officials feared. Such a massacre would undermine U.S. interests in the Muslim world and beyond.
The CIA’s top leaders reviewed the proposed raid in June 1998. The discussion revealed similar doubts among senior officers in the Directorate of Operations. In the end, as CIA Director George J. Tenet described it to colleagues years later, the CIA’s relevant chain of command — Jack Downing, then chief of the Directorate of Operations; his deputy James Pavitt; O’Connell and Pillar — all recommended against going forward with the Tarnak raid.
By then, there was no enthusiasm for the plan in the Clinton White House, either. “Am I missing something? Aren’t these people going to be mowed down on their way to the wall?” Clarke asked his White House and CIA colleagues sarcastically, one official recalled.
Tenet never formally presented the raid plan for Clinton’s approval, according to several officials involved.
The decision was cabled to Islamabad. The tribal team’s plans should be set aside, perhaps to be revived later. Meanwhile, the agents were encouraged to continue to look for opportunities to catch bin Laden away from Tarnak, where, among other things, an ambush attempt would carry relatively little risk of civilian deaths.
Some of the working-level CIA officers involved in the planning reacted bitterly to the decision. They believed that the kidnapping plan could succeed.
Less than two months later, on Aug. 7, 1998, two teams of al-Qaeda suicide bombers launched synchronized attacks against two U.S. embassies in Africa. In Nairobi, 213 people died and 4,000 were injured. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the toll was 11 dead and 85 wounded. Within months, the New York federal grand jury previously investigating bin Laden delivered an indictment of the Saudi for directing the strikes, among other alleged crimes.
At Langley’s Counterterrorist Center, some CIA analysts and officers were devastated and angry as they watched the televised
A second group planned to roll quietly toward the front gate in two vehicles. They would carry silenced pistols to take out two guards at the entrance. Meanwhile, the other attackers would have burst into the several small huts where bin Laden’s wives slept. When they found the tall, bearded Saudi, they would cuff him, drag him toward the gate and load him into a Land Cruiser. Other vehicles back at the rally point would approach in sequence, and together they would go to the provisioned cave about 30 miles away.
Satellite photography and reports from the ground indicated that there were dozens of women and children living at Tarnak. Langley asked members of the tribal team to explain in detail how they planned to minimize harm to bystanders during their assault.
The CIA officers involved thought their agents were serious, semiprofessional fighters who were trying to cooperate as best they could. Yet “if you understood the Afghan mind-set and the context,” recalled an officer involved, it was clear that in any raid the Afghans would probably fire indiscriminately at some point.
In Washington, Richard Clarke, the White House counterterrorism coordinator, drove out to Langley to meet with his CIA counterpart, O’Connell, who briefed him on the details of the Tarnak attack plan and how much it would cost. O’Connell also outlined the political risks, including the potential problem of civilian casualties.
Members of the White House counterterrorism team reacted skeptically. Their sense was that the TRODPINT agents were old anti-Soviet mujaheddin who had long since passed their peak fighting years and were probably milking the CIA for money while minimizing the risks they took on the ground. If they did go through with a Tarnak raid, women and children would die and bin Laden would probably escape, some White House officials feared. Such a massacre would undermine U.S. interests in the Muslim world and beyond.
The CIA’s top leaders reviewed the proposed raid in June 1998. The discussion revealed similar doubts among senior officers in the Directorate of Operations. In the end, as CIA Director George J. Tenet described it to colleagues years later, the CIA’s relevant chain of command — Jack Downing, then chief of the Directorate of Operations; his deputy James Pavitt; O’Connell and Pillar — all recommended against going forward with the Tarnak raid.
By then, there was no enthusiasm for the plan in the Clinton White House, either. “Am I missing something? Aren’t these people going to be mowed down on their way to the wall?” Clarke asked his White House and CIA colleagues sarcastically, one official recalled.
Tenet never formally presented the raid plan for Clinton’s approval, according to several officials involved.
The decision was cabled to Islamabad. The tribal team’s plans should be set aside, perhaps to be revived later. Meanwhile, the agents were encouraged to continue to look for opportunities to catch bin Laden away from Tarnak, where, among other things, an ambush attempt would carry relatively little risk of civilian deaths.
Some of the working-level CIA officers involved in the planning reacted bitterly to the decision. They believed that the kidnapping plan could succeed.
Less than two months later, on Aug. 7, 1998, two teams of al-Qaeda suicide bombers launched synchronized attacks against two U.S. embassies in Africa. In Nairobi, 213 people died and 4,000 were injured. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the toll was 11 dead and 85 wounded. Within months, the New York federal grand jury previously investigating bin Laden delivered an indictment of the Saudi for directing the strikes, among other alleged crimes.
At Langley’s Counterterrorist Center, some CIA analysts and officers were devastated and angry as they watched the televised