the American Revolution would produce.
Over the brigadiers was the commander in chief, who was directly responsible to the Congress of the Colonies.
[6]
HE ALSO FEET RESPONSIBLE to his brigadiers. A week after the defeat in Brooklyn, he called them together to talk about whether they should try to defend New York City and Manhattan Island against the British fleet and army or whether they should retreat and take up their position in a better place. As always, his general staff was divided; and as was often the case, the division was between those who had been trained in foreign military establishments and those who were volunteer soldiers out of American civilian life. The professionals looked down upon the Americans, both as soldiers and as colonials.
General Roche de Fermoy led the trend of professional opinion in the belief that New York City could be held. This was boastful and impractical, but Fermoy still commanded a Pennsylvania rifle regiment that had been untouched by Brooklyn Heights. He insisted that the British soldiers could be picked off if they were to leave their great warships and attempt a landing. There was considerable sourness about riflemen in battle, and such civilian general officers as Nathanael Greene and William Alexander had the deepest respect for the huge ships of the line that had anchored in the Upper Bay and in the Hudson River. Like Washington, they were involved in a venture upon which they had staked life and family, and they were desperately eager not to be caught in a trap.
The result of the argument among the general officers was that the commander in chief allowed himself to be pressed into a ridiculous compromise, and against all his better judgment. In time, he would trust only himself because there was no alternative. But now he was still the amiable amateur, trying to please everyone. And even though he had told those closest to him that he believed the city could not be held, and even though he knew the danger of risking his cause on an island when the British controlled the water, he allowed himself to be talked into dividing his army. Five thousand men were retained for the defense of New York City and Manhattan Island, and nine thousand were sent to build a fortified position at the little village of Kingsbridge in the Bronx. Two thousand more were stationed in the northern part of Manhattan.
Sixteen thousand in all. Eight days before, he had commanded over twenty thousand men. The attrition was terrifying, and he and his officers knew that it had only begun.
Another week, and the British made their second move. They sailed their great warships into Kipâs Bay, and began a thunderous cannonade of the beach, while the British regulars and marines were carried ashore by landing boats. Anticipating the move by watching the progress of the ships, Washington had stationed riflemen on the shore to pick off the British soldiers in the landing boats. But when the cannonading began, the riflemen panicked. It was simply too close to the memories of Brooklyn Heights, and the riflemen threw down their guns and ran away. Washington and Nathanael Greene charged down on the fleeing men, screaming and swearing and threatening themâand eventually they caused some line of battle to be formed. But it was too late. New York City was lost.
The American army fled on the double, and Washington organized them into a line of defense across the whole of Manhattan Island about seven miles to the north, just beyond the deep valley of Harlem, which was then called the Hollow Way.
Entrenched on Harlem Heights above the Hollow Way, Washington and his generals took heart. This was the strongest position they had held since the Battle of Bunker Hill, and since they commanded every road north through Manhattan, the British would have to march against them and sweep them out of the way.
But General Howe was past the stage of marching against hilltops where the Americans crouched in ditches.