continues to enjoy remarkable political stability. This political stability is rooted in the country’s comparative social cohesion (lack of sectarian tensions as in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia), its unitary polity and small size (compared to the United Arab Emirates and Oman), and a relatively apolitical, small national population (compared to Kuwait). These factors have combined to give the state relative latitude in pursuing foreign policy agendas it may not have otherwise been able to pursue. Finally, vast revenues derived from oil and natural gas have given the state the capacity and the financial resources to embark on projects and initiatives—such as Al Jazeera television or extensive mediation efforts—that have given it a relatively unique identity in the international arena.
A third significance in the study of Qatar lies in the broader lessons we can draw for international relations theory from the country’s international profile and its diplomatic initiatives. As discussed in chapter 2, small states are generally assumed to be on the receiving end of power rather than its originators. But Qatar, a small state, has managed to become a consequential, and in many ways influential, player on the international stage. What does this say about the evolving nature of power relationship in the international arena? More specifically, what kind of power has Qatar accumulated that accounts for its international behavior? Although Al Jazeera has enhanced the country’s international stature, particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring, Qatar is too small and its cultural products too limited and narrow to have bestowed the country with meaningful levels of “soft” power. Nor can the country be said to have amassed “smart” power, which strategically combines soft and hard powers for specific purposes. Qatar has accumulated its power through a track record of high-profile mediations, generous spending and commercially strategic investments across the globe, doses of soft power (through Al Jazeera), and a hyperactive diplomacy. Clearly, Qatar’s ability to do these things is significantly enhanced, if not made entirely possible, by the military protection afforded to it through the American security umbrella.
I posit that in Qatar’s case this new form of international power may best be conceptualized as “subtle” power, which is contingent on a combination of interrelated elements. To begin with, military security , guaranteed by the US security umbrella, enables the state to devote its attention to issues that are not strictly security-related and to instead pursue goals and strategies that enhance its diplomatic stature and strengthen its political economy both at home and abroad. Equally important is the state’s considerable wealth , which gives it enhanced domestic autonomy and leverage in co-opting domestic actors, on the one hand, and, on the other, the ability to pursue a wide array of international goals and strategies. For Qatar, many of these international goals and strategies have revolved around buying influence and using financial largesse to set or at least to influence agendas. A small state with little history, Qatar has sought to spend its way into a position of Arab leadership. But by itself money is not a sufficient ingredient of subtle power; how it is deployed is. Qatar’s leaders have a clear vision of their ideal role in the Arab world, namely as one of its most visible leaders and agenda-setters, and to make that vision a reality they seem to be sparing no expenses. In doing so they have adopted an aggressive global branding campaign aimed at portraying the country as dynamic, progressive, stable, and investment friendly. The ensuing visibility and the pursuit of a positive international image is reinforced by an active diplomacy meant to further enhance the country’s stature and influence. This active diplomatic profile, part of the state leaders’ carefully crafted vision, has