almost anyone with a credit
card and two thousand square feet of laboratory
space, could construct a biological weapon hi a
matter of weeks from inexpensive, off-the-shelf
technology. Years ago Saddam Hussein got
into the biological warfare business with anthrax
cultures purchased from an American mail-order
supply house and delivered via overnight mail.
Ten grams of anthrax properly dispersed can kill
as many people as a ton of the nerve gas Sarin. What was
that estimate Jake saw recently”…one hundred
kilograms of anthrax delivered by an efficient
aerosol generator on a large urban target would
kill from two to six times as many people as a
one-megaton nuclear device.
Of course, Jake Grafton reflected,
anthrax was merely one of over one hundred and
sixty known biological warfare agents. There were
others far deadlier but equally cheap to manufacture
and disperse. Still, obtaining a culture was merely a
first step; the journey from culture dishes
to
a reliable weapon that could be safely stored and
accurately employedanything other than a spray
tankwas long, expensive, and fraught with engineering
challenges.
Jake Grafton had had a few classified
briefings about CBW-WHICH stood for chemical and
biological warfare but he knew little more than diswas
available in the public press. These weren’t the
kinds of secrets that rank-and-file naval
officers had a need to know. Since the Kennedy
administration insisted on developing other military
response capabilities besides nuclear warfare,
the United States had researched, developed, and
manufactured large stores of nerve gas, mustard
gas, incapacitants, and defoliants. Research
on biological agents went forward in tandem at
Fort Detrick, Maryland, and ultimately led to the
manufacture of weapons at Pine Bluff
Arsenal in Arkansas. These highly classified
programs were undertaken with little debate and almost no
publicity. Of course the Soviets had their own
classified programs. Only when accidents
occurredlike the accidental slaughter of 6,000
sheep thirty miles from the Dugway
Proving Ground in Utah during the late
1960’s, or the deaths of sixty-six people at
Sverdlovsk in 1979 did the public get a
glimpse into this secret world.
Nerve gases were loaded into missile and rocket
warheads, bombs, land mines, and artillery shells.
Biological agents were loaded into missile
warheads, cluster bombs, and spray tanks and
dispensers mounted on aircraft.
Historically nations used chemical or
biological weapons against an enemy only when the
enemy lacked the means to retaliate in kind. The
threat of massive American retaliation had
deterred Saddam Hussein from the use of chemical
and biological weapons in the 1991 Gulf War,
yet these days deterrence was politically incorrect.
In 1993 the United States signed the
Chemical Weapons Convention, thereby agreeing
to remove chemical and biological weapons from its
stockpiles.
The U.s. military had been in no hurry
to comply with the treaty, of course, because without the threat of
retalia-
STEPHEN COONTS
tion there was no way to prevent these weapons
being used against American troops and civilians.
The waiting was over, apparently. The politicians
in Washington were getting their way: the United
States would not retaliate against an enemy with
chemical or biological weapons even if
similar weapons were used to slaughter Americans.
When Jake Grafton finished his push-ups and
stood, the staff operations officer, Commander Toad
Tarkington, was there with a towel. Toad was slightly
above medium height, deeply tanned, and had a
mouthful of perfect white teeth that were visible when he
smiled or laughed, which he often did. The admiral
wiped his face on the towel, then picked up the
binoculars and once again focused them on the cargo
ships.
“Glad the decision to destroy those things wasn’t one
I had to makeea”…Toad Tarkington said.
“There are a lot of