Circle of Treason Read Free Page B

SE Division, I couldn’t have been happier. The slot was that of Deputy Chief of the Research Branch, under Joseph F, a seasoned officer with a compendious knowledge of the KGB. My specific task was to write a study on the GRU. It took about eighteen months to complete this study, which was eventually published for DO consumption in November 1976 under the title The GRU Today.
    While writing this study I first became privy to the Polyakov case and the fount of information he had provided. Luckily in the early 1970s we had three junior officer defectors from the GRU. While what they told us was of some interest, their production could not compare with that of Polyakov. They provided “cover,” however, in that the average reader of The GRU Today would be inclined to believe that these three defectors were the source of much of the material presented. In reality, of course, Polyakov’s information formed the backbone of the study. It was during the writing of this study that I first began my professional association with Sandy, who was the Agency’s expert when it came to Polyakov.
    By now it was the late 1970s. The Division had become aware that the U.S. intelligence community had a need for counterintelligence information, but most of what was available to us was not being disseminated outside the DO, except perhaps to the FBI. To correct this shortcoming, two new branches were established in the Counterintelligence Group. One, headed by Faith McCoy, disseminated CI reporting from Soviet sources. The other, to which I was named Chief, did the same for East European sources. This arrangement lasted for about one year. Faith then left for an overseas position, the two CI production branches were melded into one, and I became chief of CI production for all of the Division’s stable of sources.
    This was a responsible and rewarding job. Some of our disseminations went to the White House. The only drawback was the looming presence of Director Casey and his preconceived ideas, and his attempts to influence operations and analysis to fit these ideas.
    Two Directorate of Intelligence projects closely involved the Production Branch. The first was the investigation into the possibility that theSoviet Union had masterminded the 1981 assassination attempt on the Pope. Despite the fact that all our clandestine reporting pointed to the conclusion that the Soviets were not involved, and despite the fact that the scenario did not jibe in the least with what we knew of KGB methods of operation, there was an attempt to make the facts fit the theory so we could use the possibility of Soviet involvement as a club with which to beat the KGB.
    I felt extremely frustrated when one of the officers in our branch wrote a long cable in response to a field inquiry. The cable pointed out what we did and did not know, and what conclusions it might be possible to draw. The cable got as far as the office of the then-Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) John Stein, where it was substantially altered so as to advise the field to use the unsupported theory against the KGB, whether we believed it or not. (I often argued, usually unsuccessfully, that the KGB had done a great many unsavory things, and that we should do our best to publicize these, instead of using information we knew or suspected was false, thereby lowering ourselves to their level.)
    The second investigation involved the extent of Soviet support for terrorism. To hear some tell it, behind every terrorist around the world with a bomb in his hand was a KGB officer whispering “Go!” The Soviets had dug themselves somewhat into a hole on this subject, because it was indisputable that they had supported Yasir Arafat in the period when he was masterminding terrorist acts. Arafat was regarded as a “freedom fighter” and could be seen on the Kremlin stand with Brezhnev and others on special occasions. The Soviets also supported some third-world groups, again