Battle Story Read Free Page B

both Britain and the Netherlands, neither country had really made any great effort to ensure that there was proper planning and organisational procedures in the pre-war years. From the 1920s onward, successive British governments had developed a policy of simply assuming that there would not be another major war for the next ten years; a policy that was renewed periodically by incoming governments as they tried to cope with the depression of the 1930s by limiting spending on defence. The huge investment in the Singapore naval base would be the great exception, but in practice the failure to provide the necessary structure to protect the base would in due course make it something of a white elephant. The base was not simply a military asset. In part it was built to show the power of the British Empire and to demonstrate an intention to retain control of the Far East colonies, and thus the mineral wealth of Malaya and the commercial value of Singapore. It was also a gesture of solidaritywith Australia and New Zealand; an indication that Britain was committed to ensuring the viability of the trade routes through the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.
    It was also a statement aimed at Japan: that Britain intended to be the primary naval power in the Western Pacific in partnership with the United States in the Central and Eastern Pacific. Naturally, such a policy rested on having a powerful and modern fleet that would be the equal of any Japanese force. Since Britain could not possibly hope to maintain such a fleet at Singapore without abandoning her commitments elsewhere, the statement was less than secure, but the British government felt confident – and with some reason – that in the event of a war with Japan, they would be able to count on American support. Planning for war in South East Asia essentially depended on the belief that Singapore could stand for 180 days, the maximum length of time that it would take to mount a relief expedition. In fact, the necessary stockpile of supplies was never amassed and the plan had not taken account of the possibility that there might be a major war in Europe that would prevent the dispatch of ships and materiel to Singapore. Defeat in the East was not inevitable even as late as 1939, and it was not unreasonable that the reality of war with Germany and Italy should take precedence over the possibility of war with Japan. There was little value in preserving distant colonies if the home country was at risk of being conquered. Equally, there was no value to maintaining a very large force of men on the other side of the world if they were not to be equipped properly, trained properly or led properly, and the failure to put sensible policies in place in any of these regards was an inexcusable dereliction of duty on the part of both the civil and military power in London.
    The planning process of the 1930s depended on a large air force and a consequent need to protect the many airfields scattered through the peninsula, but there were also political and diplomatic considerations. British rule in Malaya had not been achieved through simple conquest and there was no single unified system of political control. The Straits Settlements – Singapore, Dinding and Penang – constituted a single Crown colony, but the rest of Malaya fell into two groups, the Federated Malay States (FMS) of Pahang, Perak, Negri Sembilan and Selangor and the Unfederated Malay States of Terengganu, Perlis, Johore, Kedah and Kelantan. The latter group enjoyed a greater degree of self-government than the others, but the British administration was obliged to provide defence for all of them. The rapid advance of the Japanese effectively rendered the treaty obligations redundant, but they had only exerted a very minor influence on the general planning process. Although there was clearly little he could do, throughout the course of the campaign Lieutenant General Arthur Percival, General Officer Commanding