An Inoffensive Rearmament Read Free Page A

be over soon.”
    Many thought so, but reality belied our wishful thinking. As the communist invaders pushed relentlessly down the peninsula of Korea, it became increasingly evident that neither the supreme commander’s “ ukase ,” nor our air or naval forces, which performed quite effectively, could stop the aggressor. 3 The North Korean forces swept the disorganized South Korean units and our small American advisory group from the fields. The situation became so chaotic that only the strong will of SCAP prevented our ambassador and the American flag from fleeing Korea. If we were to halt the aggression, American ground troops would have to be sent to Korea.
    After the hectic week of uncertainties, General MacArthur launched his tragic double offensive. The 24th Infantry Division, one of the American units on occupation duty in Japan, was alerted for battle. Almost immediately, to show our resolve to the world, a battalion of the 24th was rudely jerked from its comfortable Japanese barracks and catapulted into the war. Rapidly in succession, one battalion of the 24th after another was dumped piecemeal into the meat grinder of Korea, each battalion understrength, undertrained, and underequipped. The officers and men did their best with what they had. The courageous commander of the 24th Division, Major General William F. Dean, personally led his troops on the field of battle until he was captured in the struggle. 4 But neither courage, patriotism, nor outbursts of loud national propaganda are adequate substitutes in war for military power, for men teamed and trained with weapons and equipment.
    We were now committed on the Asian continent, fighting in a whirlwind that would suck into its vortex the cream of our youth and billions of dollars in natural treasure. This sacrifice was to be made in a remote area of the world, an area that our Joint Chiefs of Staff in a secret memorandum of September 1947 had said was of “little strategic interest.”
    Some months before the North Korean attack, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, supported by our Joint Chiefs of Staff, drew a line of demarcation in the Far East between communism and the Western world. In effect, we said, “Communism this far and no farther.” That line extended from Alaska to the Philippines and included on our side the Aleutian Islands, Japan, and Okinawa.Taiwan and Korea were not within the “Acheson Line.” Accordingly, in South Korea we maintained only a small military advisory and assistance group.
    In Japan we had four understrength divisions. The 7th Infantry Division was stationed in the northern part of HonshÅ«, the largest of the four Japanese islands, and on Hokkaidō, the sparsely populated northernmost island, near the Soviet Kuriles and Sakhalin. The 1st Cavalry Division was located in the Kantō Plain, with some of its units in the city of Tōkyō, where it assumed the character of palace guards for SCAP. The 25th Infantry Division was comfortably resting in the Kansai Plain with its headquarters in Ōsaka, at the time Japan’s second largest city. The 24th Infantry Division, which was the first to become engaged, was scattered over the southernmost island of KyÅ«shÅ«, lying directly south of Korea. These forces were deployed in Japan to defend the country. They were not intended to fight on the Asian mainland.
    With the commitment of the 24th to Korea, the 25th Division was side-slipped south to defend KyÅ«shÅ«. But it did not remain there long. By July 18, the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division joined the 24th in the war, and Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker rushed his Eighth Army Headquarters from Yokohama to Korea. Thus, three weeks after the Korean War began, only the 7th Division with some Army service troops and Air Force units remained in Japan, and even the 7th was alerted to go.
    In those crucial days, the United States became rapidly aware that we did not have enough